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Conventional accounts of epistemic opacity, particularly those that stem from the definitive work 
of Paul Humphreys, typically point to limitations on the part of epistemic agents to account for 
the distinct ways in which systems, such as computational methods and devices, are opaque. 
They point, for example, to the lack of technical skill on the part of an agent (Burrell, 2016; 
Kaminski, 2017), the failure to meet standards of best practice (Saam, 2017; Hubig, 2017), or 
even the nature of an agent (Humphreys, 2009) as reasons why epistemically relevant elements 
of a process may be inaccessible. In this paper I argue that there are certain instances of 
epistemic opacity— particularly in computational methods such a computer simulations and 
machine learning processes—that (1) do not arise from, (2) are not responsive to, and (3) are 
therefore not explained by the epistemic limitations of an agent. I call these instances agent-
neutral and agent-independent instances of epistemic opacity respectively. As a result, I also 
argue that conventional accounts of epistemic opacity offer a limited understanding of the full 
spectrum of kinds and sources of epistemic opacity, particularly of the kind found in 
computational methods. In particular, as I will show below, the limitations of these accounts are 
reflected in the way they fail to provide satisfactory explanations when faced with certain 
instances of opacity.  
 
Humphreys’ (2004; 2009) seminal definitions are by now commonly accepted as agent-based 
definitions (Symons and Alvarado, 2016; Alvarado, 2020; San Pedro, forthcoming).1 That is, 
they seek to provide an account of epistemic opacity in virtue of an agent’s epistemic limitations. 
Therefore, as I will show here, they are limited in this respect vis-à-vis instances of agent-
independent instances of opacity. However, more recent accounts of epistemic opacity are also 
limited in that they fail to recognize —or in some instances deliberately seek to explain away— 
the fundamental differences in kind between essential opacity (Humphreys, 2009) and a more 
general and circumstance-relative epistemic opacity. Hence, taken together, I argue that 
conventional accounts of epistemic opacity, both old and new, offer a limited understanding of 
the phenomenon of epistemic opacity in that 
 
a) They are all agent-based,  
b) So far they have failed to account for differences in kind of opacity, and 
c) They are not adequately explanatory of the phenomenon itself in important instances. 
 
Let us briefly examine each one of these issues. First, conventional accounts of epistemic opacity 
are limited in that they fail to account for the fact that there are instances of epistemic opacity 
that are not explained by agential limitations regarding resources, practices, and/or efforts. So, 
not all instances of epistemic opacity are agent-based.  
 
 
1 This particular aspect of Humphreys’ definitions was often overlooked due to the fact that epistemic opacity, as an 
epistemic phenomena was understood to always involve an epistemic agent. However, what was often neglected was 
that just because an epistemic phenomena requires an agent, doesn’t mean that the agent is the cause and/or the 
source of the phenomena. As we will see below, this is an extremely valuable distinction in this context.  
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Secondly, unlike Humphreys’ (2004; 2009) original definitions, recent efforts to provide a 
comprehensive spectrum of epistemic challenges in computational methods have sought to 
explain away the fact that Humphreys’ second and stronger formulation of epistemic opacity is 
not only a stronger version of the same phenomenon, but rather a different kind of epistemic 
opacity. In particular, these recent efforts (Kruger et al, 2020; San Pedro 2021) have either failed 
to recognize and/or sought to actively minimize the importance of an impossibility clause in 
Humphreys’ stronger definition. In other words, they offer a deflationary account of essential 
epistemic opacity as something that could be mitigated through resourceful strategies. However, 
it is this particular clause regarding impossibility that posits that while some instances of 
epistemic opacity may be minimized or overcome by changing the circumstances of an agent, 
some other instances offer an impossible challenge to some agents given their nature. This is 
both an important and inescapable contribution of Humphreys’ early insight into the 
phenomenon of epistemic opacity. Importantly, the phenomenon identified by Humphreys is also 
not something that can be wished away with better practices.   
 
Finally, while the insights provided by conventional accounts of epistemic opacity—both of the 
original definitions offered by Humphreys and more recent efforts—have proven extremely 
useful in the understanding of some important epistemic challenges posed by computational 
methods, these accounts suffer from an explanatory limitation: because they are all agent-based 
accounts of epistemic opacity— that is, because they all make reference to agential 
circumstances and limitations— they lack the conceptual framework to explain the features of 
the world, other than the agent, that often contribute, in a very relevant sense, to the reasons why 
something is or is not opaque. In this sense, they fail to properly explain the reasons why, the 
sources from which, and the nature of the emergence of epistemic opacity vis-à-vis certain 
processes. This is particularly the case in the context of computational methods such as computer 
simulations and machine learning processes in which, as I will show, opacity can sometimes 
emerges in virtue of something other than the agent’s epistemic resources, efforts, and/or 
limitations.  
  
Kinds of epistemic opacity 
 
Broadly, the term epistemic opacity refers to the lack of access that an inquiring agent may have 
to the relevant aspects by which a process achieves whatever task it is supposed to achieve. In 
other words, an epistemically opaque process is a one whose significant details about its 
functioning are not available to someone seeking to understand it, make use of it, or someone 
who is subject to the results emerging from the fulfillment of its task.  
 
Humphreys succinctly defines epistemic opacity the following way: 
 
“A process is epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive agent X at time t just in case X does 
not know at t all of the epistemically relevant elements of the process.” (2009) 
 
As can be noted, defining epistemic opacity this way allows for a very broad interpretation of the 
processes that can be characterized as epistemically opaque. We can, for example imagine many 
processes to be epistemically opaque to many people at many times: the processes in your 
computer, the processes by which books are bound, the processes of bending wood can all be 
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opaque to some of us. These processes are epistemically opaque in so far as the relevant 
elements by which they fulfill their task or arrive at a result are not accessible to someone in their 
capacity as a knower. Consequently, a process that is generally opaque in the way defined above 
is also only opaque to some people but not to others. And, furthermore, just as these type of  
processes are opaque to some people but not others, such processes can also cease to be opaque 
to a single person at a different time. In other words, the main feature of this account of 
epistemic opacity is that it is very generally applicable. It is, in other words a general and relative 
account of epistemic opacity as  it is relative to a specific agent the agent’s circumstances at a 
specific time (Humphreys, 2004; Symons and Alvarado, 2016; Alvarado, 2020).  
 
These three points above make the concept of general epistemic opacity not only too broad but 
also not very informative concerning the particular causes and sources of epistemic opacity, 
particularly when it comes to  epistemic opacity in computational methods. The definition 
basically says that whenever an agent is in a circumstance and/or a time in which a process’ 
epistemically relevant elements are not known, then the process is opaque, which is most of the 
time for most of the processes for most of the agents. As defined, the concept seems to capture 
every single instance of an agent facing a process previous to knowledge-acquisition. That is to 
say, before anybody knows anything about something that something can be characterized as 
opaque in the manner defined above. One can, for example imagine that at every point in 
someone’s lives some things will be epistemically opaque without representing a significant 
epistemic challenge. This makes the concept seem a little trivial. In other words, almost every 
single process a growing human will come to understand was at some point epistemically opaque 
to them. It is in this sense too that the concept may be mistaken as not very philosophically 
interesting. After all, some things are unknown to some of us at some point, known to others at 
the same time, and can become known at another time by the same agents to which it was 
unknown. However, while opaque may sometimes imply unknown, unknown does not 
necessarily imply opaque. Pointing to something as being epistemically opaque in the manner 
defined above does not provide any interesting and or peculiar information about the system in 
relation to anything else. This is particularly the case if what one is trying to understand and say 
something about is a specific piece of technology. 
 
Because of this last point, in the context of computational methods deployed in inquiry,  
philosophers (Kaminski et al., 2018) and sociologists of science and computation (Saam, 2017) 
have tried to be more specific about the distinct ways in which a particular computational 
processes, such as computer simulations and machine learning algorithms, may come to be 
opaque, as well as to whom it may be opaque to and when it may be opaque to them. These 
accounts, which I will examine in some detail below, have correctly identified the importance of 
identifying not only the systems that are opaque but also the importance of identifying the 
sources, reasons, and/or instances in virtue of which the system is opaque.  
 
Below are a few examples of more detailed accounts of opacity that still can be categorized as 
general and relative as explained above. They are also very closely related to social aspects to the 
design, development and/or deployment of computational technology. Hence, I group them all in 






Social epistemic opacity 
 
Sometimes social aspects contribute to making a process, set of processes, and/or a device 
epistemically opaque to someone. In these instances, what is at play is a kind of social epistemic 
opacity (Kaminski et al., 2017; Burrell, 2016). I will use this term to refer to any and all 
instances of epistemic opacity which arise in virtue of social features of a given circumstance. 
There are, however, distinctions within social opacity regarding the source of opacity. Social 
factors can be of many kinds. Division of labor, proprietary limitations on access, intentional 
secrecy, etc. all contribute to making the workings of a system, process or device inaccessible to 
some while accessible to others, and hence generally, and relatively epistemically opaque as 
defined above. Kaminski and others, for example  (Saam, 2017; Hubig, 2017), point towards the 
fact that a non-trivial number of engineers and computer scientist are required in order to put 
together a successful computer model of the kind that simulates complex phenomena such as the 
weather. This makes knowing all the functional details of the process of simulation simply 
inaccessible to any one of the individuals involved. Hence, some of the epistemically relevant 
processes in a computer simulation of weather phenomena are epistemically opaque to many, if 
not all, of the individual agents involved in its creation.  
 
This problem of course is not new, nor is its identification as a problem. Helen Nissenbaum 
(1990), for example, identified the difficulties to ascribe moral responsibility to any one agent in 
particular in the context of computational technology, which is often developed by vast teams 
belonging to (sometimes distinct) corporate structures. Knowing exactly who did what would 
prove an intractable task. She called this issue the “many hands problem” in responsibility 
ascription (Nissenbaum, 1990).  
 
In a similar manner, the vast structural division of labor in massive computational projects, 
makes is so that thoroughly understanding the totality of the underlying functionality is not 
practically viable. This, of course, applies not just to the many hands involved in the design and 
development of a single piece of technology but importantly to the fact that each piece of 
technology that is used in the computational process is also made of many different devices 
(Simoulin, 2007; 2017). Moving away from the question of moral responsibility and towards the 
question of epistemic access to relevant elements of a system this is just a “many everything and 
anything problem” in modern technological devices, particularly those involving computational 
elements (Alvarado, 2020): many hands, many devices, many functions, etc., make it so that 
knowing the relevant epistemic elements of the process (in this case, whatever task these 
computational devices carry out) is generally opaque to most agents involved at most times.   
 
Jenna Burrell (2016) on the other hand provides an even more detailed account of the epistemic 
opacity at play in what she calls socially consequential contexts. In her account one can find 
three different sources of epistemic opacity, two of which can be directly mapped with our 
discussion above concerning the social sources of such inaccessibility to relevant elements of a 
particular system. For her, there are two kinds of socially explained epistemic opacity. The first 
instance of opacity arises from the simple fact that no single individual can know everything 
and/or can know anything a priori (as I have also specified above). Rather, there will be 
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specialization and there will be technical training to elucidate even things one is familiar with. 
This is called by others, particularly  Kaminski et al. (2017), ‘technical opacity’: some systems 
are opaque simply because of the level and complexity of the technical details related to their 
functioning. This is in a sense why technical education is required and why there are many and 
diverse experts involved in a single, seemingly homogenous project, such as computer 
engineering. The second kind of social opacity in Burrell’s work refers to the kind of opacity that 
arises from intentional barriers to access to the internal processes of a given technology. Here, 
very straightforward circumstances explain why a device and/or process may be kept from some 
people: someone wants to keep it that way. Institutional secrecy is often cited as the origin of this 
kind of deliberate social epistemic opacity.2 
 
It is important to note here, that the different sources of opacity so far discussed above, even the 
different sources of social opacity, are all relative to an agent, to an agent’s circumstances and 
may all be simultaneously at play in a given setting. This in itself makes a circumstance in which 
opacity arises slightly a bit more problematic than a simple instance in which only one source of 
general opacity is present.  However, computational processes, such as the ones required to build 
successful computer simulations and/or the ones deployed to execute sophisticated analytics such 
as machine learning, may also prove to be opaque in an even more problematic way. A given 
device, method or process can be opaque simply on the basis that its inner processes are beyond 
what any given individual agent can reasonably track and/or understand (Humphreys, 2004; 
2009; Symons and Alvarado, 2016; Burrell, 2016; Alvarado 2020). A system, device, or set of 
processes that is opaque in this manner—beyond the epistemic resources not just of a given 
individual at a given time but of any one individual of the same kind at any time— is what 
Humphreys called essential epistemic opacity (2009). Details of this account follow below.   
 
Essential epistemic opacity 
 
According to Humphreys, a system, process or device is essentially epistemically opaque 
 
“iff it is impossible, given the nature of X, for X to know all of the epistemically relevant 
elements of the process.” (2009) 
 
Let us take a moment to look at the details in Humphrey’s account of essential opacity. Given 
recent attempts to explain away the difference in kind of epistemic opacities (See San Pedro, in 
this issue), a question arises as to whether the difference between the general account of 
epistemic opacity described above and essential opacity is a matter of kind or of degrees. Here I 
argue that their difference is a difference in kind. That is, essential opacity is not just a stronger 
version of the general opacity described above. Rather, it is a different kind of opacity. This is 
made clear by two main factors: the first one is that it is the kind of opacity that arises in virtue of 
the agent’s nature and not in virtue of something else.3 Essential opacity arises in virtue of 
 
2 As we will see below, it is clear that just calling all of these instances of opacity “social” opacity, is a bit of a broad 
stroke. Afterall, there are significant differences between the opacity that arises from the division of labor and the 
one that arises in virtue of institutional secrecy. They may in fact be different kinds of opacity, except for the fact 
that they are both relative and general. 
 
3 It is the appeal to the nature of an agent that makes this definition ‘essential’. In other words, one can interpret the 
opacity in question as having arisen in virtue of the essence of the agent’s epistemic nature.   
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something other, something more essential, than general opacity. It is also conceptually and 
practically distinct. Solving or minimizing cases of general opacity do not in any way, shape or 
form solves or minimizes essential epistemic opacity. Secondly, as the definition of essential 
opacity suggests, given the agent’s nature, it is impossible for that agent to access the relevant 
epistemic elements of that process, system and/or device. This impossibility is a markedly 
distinct feature of essential epistemic opacity. I argue that even if one can compare one challenge 
with another, the fact that one is a challenge that allows for a possible solution and the other one 
is impossible to overcome makes one a different kind of challenge, namely: an impossible 
challenge.4   
 
Both items—the agent’s nature and the impossibility related to it— in the definition are 
important enough for Humphreys to have felt the need to formulate a second, independent, 
definition of epistemic opacity. So, let us spend a few lines on each of those clauses, starting by 
the distinction between a kind of opacity arising in virtue of an agent’s circumstances and/or 
time of appraisal, and another instance of opacity arising in virtue of an agent’s nature.  
 
Degrees, kinds and impossibility in essential epistemic opacity 
 
The first issue, concerning two challenges being distinct given that they emerge in virtue of 
distinct sources is fairly straightforward. It is easy to conceive, for example, that problems 
emerging in virtue of two distinct things are two different kinds of problem, even when the 
context in which they emerge is somewhat similar.5  
 
Consider the following situations and the challenges associated with remedying them. When 
mathematicians, philosophers and craftsmen were trying to assess the reliability of early 
telescopes they faced many different kinds of challenges. One of the contexts in which these 
different kinds of challenges came to the fore was not only to do with the instrument per se, but 
rather with the development of the tests to test the instrument (Van Helden, 1994). While 
craftsmen were focused on the accuracy of the instrument and the development of optical 
techniques for appropriate lenses, a different kind of challenge arose. What testers found out as 
they were testing their apparatus out in the field was that what was on the other side of the test 
was of equal importance than what was inside the instrument. Even when the lenses of the 
telescope were not really accurate, some of the people taking the test could accurately describe 
what was on the other side. This was because early tests involved known texts and a pool of 
participants that were well-read and therefore familiar with such texts. So they could just guess 
from the first couple of words what followed. When the testers changed the text to display a 
random assortment of letters, they found out a similar problem arose given the prevalent features 
of some fonts: people could still discern between different letters on the other side of the field 
even when the lenses were not very good. So, lens craftsmen and those early natural 
philosophers who were focused on the nature of light and glass had to partner up with people in 
 
4 As we will see below, the impossibility at the heart of this definition of epistemic opacity is non-trivially debatable 
(San Pedro, this issue; Duran and Formanek, 2017; Duran, 2018). I will argue that even a weaker version of 
impossibility is sufficient to mark the phenomenon of essential epistemic opacity as a different kind of opacity from 
that of the general account.  
 
5 Please see footnote 2.  
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the paper-making industry as well as with those in the printing press industry. This was done in 
order to solve the issue of reliability of a new instrument.  
 
Here were two challenges: one, make a glass lens and an apparatus to carry the light in such a 
way that the other side of a field becomes clearly visible to someone looking through the 
apparatus; and two, develop a testing methodology that includes appropriately vetted materials to 
avoid biased testing. Both challenges were related to the reliability assessment of the telescope. 
Both challenges could be compared with regards to difficulty. It may have been more or less 
difficult to produce an accurate lens than to design a less salient font or a less reflective paper. 
But there is nothing to suggest that they are the same challenge, or even the same kind of 
challenge.   
 
In a sense, solving one challenge may prove more difficult than solving the other, and in a scale 
of solvability of challenges one problem may be at one end of the spectrum and the other one at 
the opposite side. However, this is not indicative of both being the same kind of problem nor of 
their difference being solely a matter of degree. One challenge arose in virtue of the nature of 
glass and the instruments meant to guide light into someone’s eye. The other challenge emerged 
in virtue of the knowledge that agents had and in virtue of the material with which they were 
presented. In order to solve one of the problems, glass, the nature of glass and the behavior of 
light had to be addressed. The other challenged had to be addressed taking into consideration the 
salient features of words and letters as well as the  degree of erudition on the part of the 
participants. The source as well as the relevant features required to consider in order to assess the 
emergence of the problem and/or the solving of each one of the problems were distinct. So is the 
nature of each of the problems.  
 
Similarly, when Humphreys suggests that a general sense of epistemic opacity arises in virtue of 
an agent’s epistemic position in relation to a process at a certain time t, and that an essential 
sense of opacity emerges in virtue of the nature of the agent, he is talking about two different 
kinds of epistemic opacity and not just two different degrees of opacity. Of course, if one is so 
inclined, one can construct a broadly encompassing spectrum comparing the degree of difficulty 
of different kinds of epistemic challenges. As expected, it will turn out that insofar as one of the 
challenges is impossible to overcome and the other one is possible to overcome, the former will 
be at the end of the spectrum of difficulty while the latter will be somewhere prior. However, this 
does not mean that the difference between both challenges is merely a matter of degrees. Their 
difference of degrees lies only in that we have built a spectrum that admits of different kinds of 
challenges and in that they are being compared in relation to a shared property: difficulty to 
solve. But even here, there is something suspect already. It is disingenuous too assume that 
something that is not solvable should be included within the brackets containing members of the 
class of solvable items. If one were strictly categorizing challenges in terms of solvability, there 
is no reason to include challenges that are by definition not solvable, i.e. impossible. Unless, of 
course, one is already questioning and/or dismissing their solvability. This takes me to the 
second feature of Humphreys definition of essential epistemic opacity: the impossibility clause. 
   
Humphreys, (2009) suggests that essential epistemic opacity is the kind of opacity that doesn’t 
just obstruct an agent from knowing the relevant elements of a system or process, but rather 
makes it impossible for such kind of agent to know the epistemically relevant elements of that 
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process. This obstruction is different from the one in the previous definition in that the task is, 
well, impossible. This impossibility is, of course, as mentioned above, in virtue of the nature of 
the agent— its essence so to speak.6 
 
There is much to say about the nature of the impossibility which goes beyond the scope and 
space of this paper. There is much to be said about what exactly this possibility entails. It is 
unclear for example if Humphreys is here referring to metaphysical, logical, or another kind of 
impossibility. Durán and Formanek (2018) rightly point that in the context of essential epistemic 
opacity, For Humphreys, “eligible possibilities are restricted by human action, which takes place 
in finite time and space and is constrained by final mental capabilities.” (p.651). This is what 
they call a ‘common sensical’ reading of possibility. What this entails is that even if one is 
unable to provide a full fleshed impossibility theorem regarding the possibility of an agent, any 
kind of agent, ever having access to the relevant epistemic elements of a given process in all 
possible worlds, one can for all intents and purposes define this impossibility in terms that are 
constrained to this particular world, with the physical and temporal dimensions that it has. In this 
world, humans are finite agents with finite resources. So are most other agents, and so one can 
easily speak of challenges as impossible if they are practically so for an agent such as us to 
overcome in any reasonable amount of time.7 For Humphreys, an example of these type of 
challenges was the opacity at play in computational processes such as computer simulations.  
 
The point above is in sharp contrast with recent attempts at explaining away the impossibility 
clause in Humphreys definition of essential epistemic opacity. San Pedro (in this issue), for 
example, suggests that given that an agent’s nature is, all things considered, itself a contingent 
feature of the world, then the definition of  essential opacity only refers to a special case of a 
weaker version of epistemic opacity (general epistemic opacity above). The reasoning is the 
following: just like the circumstances of a given agent at time t can be what makes a process 
opaque and can be changed at a different time making the process either not opaque or less 
opaque in the general definition, so is the nature of an agent. In other words, the process is only 
opaque to a given agent given the agent’s nature, change the nature of the agent or change the 
agent and the process will cease to be opaque or will become more or less opaque. San Pedro 
grants that changing an agent’s nature is not as easy as changing the circumstances of an agent. 
That is why San Pedro also grants that overcoming essential epistemic opacity is harder. As we 
will see below, accounts such as this risk neglecting Humphreys point in calling such instances 
of opacity essential epistemic opacity: there is an impossibility to it and such impossibility is tied 
to the essence of something. These two elements of the definition are meant to capture the fact 
that if you change the nature—i.e. essence—of that something then it ceases to be that something 
 
6 While it may prove strange to some practitioners and pragmatist philosophers for Humphreys to use the terms and 
concepts of impossibility, nature and/or to elicit the ghosts of essentialist metaphysics, that Humphreys does this as a 
philosopher is not strange at all. This is particularly evident if one considers his body of work concerning non-
anthropocentric epistemologies: in his book Extending Ourselves (2009) , for example, he speculates about a science 
neither for us or by us. Similarly, in his paper “Network Epistemology” (2010), he posits the possibility of 
knowledge by complex objects such as networks. This is another instance in which it is worth noting that 
Humphreys’ use of this term is neither trivial nor superfluous but rather deliberate.  
 
7 As we will see below, one can do the same thing even considering a broadly extended version of an agent, 
particularly when that agent, any agent, is faced with challenges that— given the physics, biology and temporal 
dimension of this world— would take more than the age of the universe to overcome.      
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and the fact that even if you do change the nature of that something, access to the epistemically 
relevant elements of a same process continues to be impossible for the same agent, prior to being 
changed. Hence, there are instances of epistemic opacity that are impossible to overcome for an 
agent in virtue of that agent’s nature. If you change the agent or their nature you did not change 
the impossibility, you only changed the problem.  
 
In other words, there are instances of essential epistemic opacity and they can occur when some 
kinds of agents encounter some computational processes. Deflationary accounts of essential 
epistemic opacity fail to capture the essential aspect of essential epistemic opacity. What 
approaches of this kind may have been able to show is that Humphreys initial assertion that 
“perhaps all of the features that are special to simulations are a result of this inability of human 
cognitive abilities to know and understand the details of the computational process. The 
computation involved in most simulations are so fast and so complex that no human or group of 
agents can in practice reproduce or understand the process” (Humphreys, 2009) may have been 
too fast, too broad, and/ or too early stated. It may very well be the case that at least some 
computer simulations, and/or some instances of opacity, that he thought were essentially opaque 
were not. But this only shows that some kinds and instances of epistemic opacity in computer 
simulations may not be of the essential kind. This does not take away, however, from the 
philosophical enterprise of identifying two distinct kinds of epistemic opacity and/or of 
identifying a second, different and insurmountable, kind to emerge in the context of 
computational methods such as software-intensive artifacts— and by extension computer 
simulations, machine learning methods, etc. (Symons and Horner, 2014; Symons and Alvarado, 
2016; Alvarado, 2020).  
 
Agent-based, agent-neutral, and agent-independent epistemic opacity 
 
In this section I argue that there are instances of epistemic opacity that are either neutral to 
and/or independent from the limitations of agents. That is, they arise in virtue of factors that are 
not responsive to or are not related to agential resources. In so far as the general account of 
epistemic opacity is based on (defined/explained by appeal to) an agent’s circumstances, and 
insofar as the account of essential epistemic opacity is based on an agent’s nature, then the 
presence or absence of epistemic opacity will be determined by an agent’s limitations. They are 
agent-based accounts of epistemic opacity (Alvarado, 2020 p. 179 note 1). Hence they offer only 
an incomplete account of the phenomenon of epistemic opacity. Importantly, both agent-neutral 
and agent-independent instances of epistemic opacity, as I will show through some examples 
below, are often to be found in relation to computational methods such as software-intensive 
instruments, processes and methods that include computer simulations and machine learning 
techniques. 
 
In particular, the accounts of epistemic opacity examined in the sections above are limited in the 
following two respects. The first one is that, as I will show, they fail to recognize and account for 
important instances of opacity in computational methods that have little to nothing to do with 
agential limitations. The second limitation is that as far as explanations of a phenomena go, 
agent-based explanations in general are unsatisfactory when agential features are not what 
account for what we are trying to understand. What I mean by this will become clearer in the 
paragraphs below.  
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Before I move on with an analysis of the limitations of agent-based accounts of epistemic 
opacity, it would be useful for me to provide an account of what an agent-neutral instance of 
epistemic opacity would look like. This is because, as far as accounts of epistemic opacity go, 
agent-neutral instances of opacity can still be formulated in relation to agential limitations. In 
this sense, they represent a sort of preliminary conceptual detachment from the agent-based 
accounts examined above and a first step towards understanding the agent-independent accounts 
I will describe at the end of this section. 
 
So, here is a working definition. Some instances of epistemic opacity are agent-neutral  
 
iff it is impossible, in virtue of a feature F of the nature of X which is also shared by all other 
epistemic agents W, for X (and by extension W) to know the epistemically relevant elements of a 
process.  
 
As we can see from this definition, essential epistemic opacity, as described in the previous 
section is still a comprehensive enough formulation to accommodate for the fact that even agent-
neutral instances of opacity are in a strong way connected to a feature of the nature of the 
agent(s). However, there is something extra to the agent-neutral explanation. It would be 
misguided, for example, to assert that all the instances of opacity in such cases are due to the 
nature of X when X stands for an individual/specific kind of agent and the opacity arises only 
because of a property (F) shared by all cognitive/epistemic agents agents.  
 
When it comes to software-intensive artifacts, such as computer simulations and/or machine 
learning processes, here is an example of an instance of opacity from Symons and Horner (2014) 
that applies in the way defined above.  
 
We can begin by conceiving of a small software program consisting of only 1000 lines of code. 
In conventional software practices, on average 1 out of 10 of those 1000 lines of code will be a 
command of the form ‘if/then/else’. This is in contrast to commands that follow the form 
‘if/then’. That is the former, but not the latter include an extra alternative bifurcation of possible 
paths the code can follow. Checking a similar size program that only had if/then commands can 
be done by examining each one of the 1000 lines of code. Including an if/then/else command, 
however, bifurcates the possible paths that the code can take. This increases the lines of code that 
have to be checked. Consider that a program with 10 if/then command lines has 10 lines to 
check. The same program with one if/then/else command will have 20 lines. If we have a 
program with 1000 lines of code, which includes an average of 1/10 if/then/else commands will 
have so many lines of code to check that it will take several times the age of the universe to do so 
(Symons and Horner, 2014; Horner and Symons 2014; 2018; Symons and Alvarado, 2016). 
Software systems involved in computational methods such as machine learning and computer 
simulations of scientific phenomena by far exceed the number of lines of code used in this 
example.  
 
A task that would take anywhere near the age of the universe to be completed is in fact a process 
that will be opaque to many more agents than just humans and our enhancing technologies, 
including computer simulations and machine learning methods. The process as described is 
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evidently essentially epistemically opaque in so far as the agent in question is us. That much is 
clear. But this instance of epistemic opacity is also agent-neutral in the following way. It doesn’t 
matter which agent takes on the task. It will remain opaque even for those agents that do have 
millions of years to spare. While the opacity in such a system is related to the fact that most, if 
not all, epistemic agents will be finite and/or younger than the universe, it is not significantly 
reduced or enhanced by any change in the agent’s capacities or resources. This is what makes it 
agent-neutral. The opacity arises in virtue of feature F, mainly X’s finite nature. Yet, being finite, 
is a property of most—if not all—epistemic agents. Therefore, this kind of opacity is not 
responsive to agential resources, capabilities or efforts. You can replace any other agent with any 
other resources and the outcome will still be the same. Details about the agent do not enhance or 
minimize the fact that the process is opaque in any significant manner. Even if we imagine a 
breakthrough in computing processes that could significantly increase the speed at which testing 
software could be done, reducing the time of that task (assessing the reliability of the code in a 
reliable manner 8) from several times the age of the universe to half that time: the process will 
remain opaque to any agent that is younger than or equal in age to the universe (Symons and 
Horner, 2014). So agential resources, such as time, computing capabilities, etc. do not in any 
way, shape or form have any significantly effect on the opacity of the process. Again, it is an 
instance of agent-neutral opacity.  
 
Now that we have an idea of what an agent-neutral kind of epistemic opacity would look like, we 
can begin to see a disconnect between the kinds of opacity that appeal to an agent’s nature and/or 
circumstances, and the kind of opacity that arises from and/or is explained by factors that have 
little to no bearing on agential limitations. So far, this agent-neutral account of opacity, as 
described above, only captures the fact that some instances of opacity, even when arising in 
virtue of some agent-related features, will be unresponsive to agent-related efforts and resources. 
 
8 Exhaustive testing of code lines is only one way of assessing reliability in software systems. A more used and 
useful approach would be to conduct tests on random samples of the code. By using conventional statistical 
inference theory, one can randomly select samples of code and test their execution. By inference, and with the 
assumption of random distribution of error in the system, a reliability assessment of the samples should give us an 
idea of the rate of error in the whole system. If 20 sample lines out of a 100 fail to do what they are supposed to do 
then we can say that the system as a whole has a 20% failure rate. However, there are two main issues with this 
approach. Even before software systems reached the size and complexity seen today, it was well established that the 
nature and distribution of error in software systems is not like that of other systems (Parnas et al., 1990 p.638). This 
is because of two reasons. The first one is that while in other engineering projects one can assume certain resilience 
to small errors, in software even a punctuation error can be catastrophic (1990, p.637). Further, the kinds of error 
that that can affect other engineering projects can be assessed by assuming that these errors are "not highly 
correlated" (1990 p.638). Because of the interconnectedness of software functioning and the fact that many errors 
are due to design (Floridi, Fresco and Primiero, 2014), errors in software cannot be considered statistically 
independent (Parnas et al., 1990) nor can they be considered randomly distributed (Parnas and Kwan, 1990; Horner 
and Symons, 2014; 2016). Thus, deploying statistical inference techniques to test samples under the assumption that 
the errors found will be randomly distributed is an invalid approach when it comes to software. Further, even if this 
technique were valid, consider the following. If the number of lines of code to be tested is of the order of magnitude 
postulated in the example above, what constitutes a significant sample set? Testing even 5% of the lines of code of a 
system with 100,000 lines of code and an average path complexity of one if/then/else bifurcation per every 10 lines 
would put us in the same position as with the original example. It would take ages to do. If we managed to test 1% 
of the lines it would be difficult to say that we now have a dependable assessment of the system's reliability. Any 




This account does not capture the fact that some instances will also have the added feature of 
arising from features of the world not related to agents. 
 
It is important to note at this point that agent-based accounts of a phenomena (in general) are 
only satisfactory accounts of that phenomenon in those instances in which something about an 
agent has something to do with the emergence of the phenomenon in question. Recognizing this 
point is extremely important for it implies that if a given phenomenon arises from— is caused 
by, emerges in virtue of— something other than anything related to the agent, then it will not be 
properly accounted for by an exclusively agent-based account of that phenomenon. This applies 
to accounts concerning the reasons why something is difficult to achieve. When we consider, for 
example, the difficulty of solving Navier-Stokes equations it would be misguided to assert that 
they are difficult to solve merely because or in virtue of the fact that we are limited epistemic 
agents while ignoring integral aspects of the equations themselves that contribute to their status 
as difficult ones to solve. They are not merely difficult for us. In a spectrum of difficulty in 
which other equations are compared (linear, etc.) these equations would be more difficult than 
the others. If the Navier-Stokes equation is hard for a baby to solve, for example it is not because 
it is a baby trying to solve it. It is not in virtue of the baby’s status as a baby. Similarly, if such 
kind of equations are difficult for a trained physicist to solve it is not because of the physicist’s 
limitations.9 
 
Just to be clear on this point, here’s another simple toy example contrasting two possible 
accounts of the same challenge. Imagine that a child asks you why we cannot see into the future. 
You come up with three possible explanations for this limitation, all of which are in fact true. 
The first one is that we can’t see into the future because we, personally, do not have the 
capacities, abilities, or tools ‘required’ to look into the future. This explanation would look 
something like this: “we cannot look into the future because you and I particularly are limited in 
such a way that we can’t look into the future.” This implies that perhaps other humans can. The 
second explanation you come up with is that we cannot see into the future because we as humans 
in general do not have the capacities, abilities, or tools ‘required’ to look into the future. This 
implies that perhaps other epistemic agents can. And the third explanation you come up with is 
that the future is the kind of thing that hasn’t yet happened, and things that haven’t happened 
cannot technically (logically, metaphysically, etc.) be ‘seen into’. Though all explanations are 
true in a way, two are agent-based while the other one is agent-neutral. I suggest that as far as 
accounts of the reasons for why a challenge is a challenge go, the latter is a more satisfactory 
account. It tells you something about the phenomenon in question (the future) that explains our 
inability to access it. In order to see why this is a more satisfactory answer more clearly, we can 
remind ourselves of the reason why a Navier-Stokes equation is difficult to solve for a baby. It is 
not because of the baby’s status as a baby.  
 
 
9 The problem regarding the difficulty of solving Navier-Stokes is not just whether or not there exists an easy way to 
solve the equations that we just don’t know about yet. The philosophical problem of explaining—accounting for—
the difficulty in solving the problem isn’t solved that way. If someone were to ask, in a not too distant future  in 
which an easier solution had been found, why humans had such trouble solving these type of equations it would still 
be misguided to simply state that it was because human beings were limited in such and such way without noting 
anything about the equations themselves that made them hard to figure out. 
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As we will see below, in fact the third explanation is more than just agent-neutral. It is agent-
independent in that the reason why we can or can’t see into the future has nothing to do with the 
agents in question. It has to do with the features of the phenomenon we are inquiring about: 
namely, the future.  
 
What agent-based accounts of epistemic opacity, including agent-neutral accounts such as the 
one defined above, fail to capture is the fact that some instances of opacity have nothing to do 
with an agent’s epistemic limitations. In the context of computational methods, such as machine 
learning techniques and/or simulation models, what this means is that these accounts fail to 
capture the fact that sometimes these processes are “not opaque because of sloppy modeling 
[practices]” or because these processes are “poorly understood”, rather they can be opaque 
simply “because they are complex.” 10 (Saam, 2017 p.80) This quote from Nicole Saam has 
many important elements. The first one is that it distinguishes between sources of opacity: bad 
practices, inadequate epistemic skills, abilities, etc. The second one is the use of the term 
‘because’ rather than any other term, which captures the causal determination of the source of 
opacity. But lastly, it also includes a much more important distinction for our discussion, namely 
the fact that it is “they”—the processes, that are complex. It points to a cause and source of 
opacity that is not derived from an agential feature and captures the fact that some instances of 
opacity arise in virtue of properties of the processes per se—things outside the agent’s epistemic 
properties. Consequentially, we can see now that while the distinction between general opacity 
and essential opacity will capture many instances of opacity, it will fail to capture instances of 
opacity that a) are not enhanced or reduced by changes in the limitations of an agent or b) do not 
emerge from the limitations or abilities of agents. It is these instances that I call agent-neutral and 
agent independent respectively. I will expand in detail about them below. 
 
Let us now take a look at agent-independent opacity, of which I have already given a sense of 
given the discussion in the paragraphs immediately above this one. It would not be very useful to 
simply provide yet another account of general epistemic opacity, only this time without an 
agential reference. This is because, once again, the account would capture too much. Afterall 
most things in the world are opaque to most agents for reasons that are beyond the agent itself. 
These instances of opacity arise in virtue of and are explained by factors other than anything 
related to the agent. Yet, many of them are in fact responsive to agential resources and/or efforts. 
That is, their opacity is enhanced and or minimized relative to things the agent can have or can 
do. In this sense, they are not truly agent-independent. 
 
So, an account of agent-independent opacity must include both the fact that the opacity does not 
arise in virtue of anything related to an agent and the fact that it is not responsive to agential 
resources and/or efforts.  
 
So, I shall say that a process P is opaque in an agent-independent manner 
 
iff it is impossible, in virtue of a feature F (and/or set of features) of the process P, which is 
irresponsive to (not enhanced or minimized by) agential resources, to know the epistemically 
relevant elements of the process. 
 
 
10 Emphasis and italics are mine.  
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Roughly, we can consider any stochastic process which is also vastly overdetermined to fit this 
description in that it is precisely the combination of its stochasticity (the randomness of paths 
chosen) and the vast overdetermination (the fact that many—too many— different paths lead to 
the same outcome) that make inquiry into the actual paths taken (the relevant epistemic elements 
of the process) inaccessible. Given that the process can and could have taken any of the possible 
paths or combination of paths and given that there are too many paths knowing exactly what 
relevant steps (paths) were taken for the process to produce its results, say by reverse engineering 
or by running another iteration, is not feasible.  
   
A similar problem arises in mathematical error related to the coupling of vast computer 
simulation models of complex dynamic systems (Kaminski, 2017; Lenhard and Hasse, 2012; 
Lenhard, 2017). Mathematical error is inherent to certain kinds of computational processes and 
computational components. Due to discretization techniques and resource constraints like array 
size, to name a couple of examples, computational approximates of continuous equations rely on 
rounding results.11  When each of the multiple components and processes in a computer 
simulation round up or down mathematical results the discrepancies between what should be and 
what the computer produces are non-trivial. The number of individual components involved in a 
simulation practice that will be prone to the kind of rounding up error described above, as well as 
their ‘bundled’ nature—the fact that they are often grouped together as elements of subsequent 
operations (Lenhard and Hasse, 2012)—make tracking and correcting for such errors simply 
unfeasible.12 Kaminski et al. (2018) refer to instances such as this as mathematical opacity.13 
 
Similarly, machine learning methods involve processes that are often unknown and untraceable 
as they do not require and often cannot consider (Burrell, 2016) human capabilities and needs—
such as explanations and/or causal orderings of a tractable size—in order to work (Alvarado and 
Humphreys, 2017). There is a sense in which if machine learning processes were designed to be 
accessible to limited representational abilities of humans they just would not work (Burrell, 2016 
p.5; Mitchell, 2019). The salient features to an algorithm are not the salient features that humans 
recognize. This can be clearly seen when we consider that modern vehicles with screens and 
automated features require two different kinds of ‘camera’: one kind for human perception in 
 
11 An array is a data structure in which values can be stored and used by computational processes following an index 
or a mathematical formula. A simple array can be represented by boxes, each of which can contain 0’s and 1’s or 
single digits from 0 to 9. Although their capacity grows, arrays in computers will store a finite number of digits and 
will lead to rounded results when the results of a computation include a number of digits that exceed the number of 
arrays available for storage. 
 
12 Presumably this limitation applies to cognitive agents such as ourselves, but also to any software-based automated 
attempt.  
 
13 There is a sense in which mathematical opacity can be avoided, of course, but not minimized. That is, if a process 
is opaque in the manner described above one can refuse to engage with it, use it, or implement it. But this is not the 
same as minimizing its opacity. Once we found out it is opaque, the process remains opaque. One does not minimize 
the opacity of an object merely avoiding it. This something that one must consider regarding essential opacity as 
well. As we saw above, at the heart of the definition of essential opacity is an impossibility clause. That is, it is 
impossible for an agent to access the epistemically relevant elements of a given process. There is a sense in which it 
is hard to imagine, as some do, that one can minimize the essential opacity of a process. Either it is essential opacity, 
or it isn’t. There is something strange about stating that something can be made more or less impossible.  
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which colors and shapes matter, and another kind that identifies depth and rate of change for the 
machine learning system to process.  
 
But there is something else to machine learning algorithms of this sort that make them opaque in 
an agent-independent manner, as described above. The scale of data, the number and properties 
of salient features that will be picked up by the process, the alterations to the main code done by 
the learning aspect of the process all contribute to its complexity and opacity in relation to us 
(Alvarado and Humphreys, 2016; Burrell 2016). However, widespread methods in machine 
learning such as deep neural networks work in such a way that their hidden layers process 
information through activation thresholds that are sometimes modified through techniques such 
as back-propagation. These techniques, in which the algorithm takes the difference between an 
incorrect and a correct result and uses it to modify the threshold weights of the neurons involved 
in the computation, are often automated. The vastness of  iterations implemented for back-
propagation error correction to work as intended in machine learning technology, as well as the 
fact that some of the activation threshold in the deep layers of a neural network are often initially 
randomly selected (particularly in unsupervised analytics), both contribute to making these 
processes opaque in an agent-independent way. Data processing methods of this kind are also 
able to  find hidden relations between hidden features of a data set, or concealed statistical 
structures (Alvarado and Humphreys, 2016). Alvarado and Humphreys (2016) call the ability of 
machine learning algorithms to process concealed statistical structures representational opacity. 
Just like in the stochastic methods briefly described above, the establishment of the weights, the 
ways by which these weights are modified and the manner by which these weights in the 
different layers then produce a result are simply not amenable to inspection, correction, or even 
assessment. They are not epistemically available, and they are the epistemically relevant 
elements of the process. That is, it is in virtue of these processes that the process itself produces a 
result.  This is an important departure from the opacity related to testing lines of code: the 
algorithm may be intractable as described above, but the weights—and the processes by which 
the weights are established— used by the algorithm to optimize its output are opaque in a more 




In the first part of this paper I focused on providing an account of what I call general epistemic 
opacity. I showed that while in its original definition it proved to be too broad, important 
developments had led researchers to formulate more particular accounts. These development 
made important contributions in the attribution of opacity to social factors such as technical 
skills, division of labor, and institutional secrecy. The combination of which pointed to more 
severe and seemingly inescapable cases of epistemic opacity such as essential epistemic opacity.  
 
The discussion in the second part of this paper aimed to show that there are significant 
differences even between conventional accounts of epistemic opacity. In particular, I showed the 
fundamental differences between general instances of opacity and essential epistemic opacity. I 
argued that while a general sense of epistemic opacity is too broad to provide an informative 
sense of the sources and nature of epistemic opacity, the essential sense of epistemic opacity 
cannot be stripped from fundamental aspects of its definition, such as its appeal to an agent’s 
nature and the impossibilities related to it, without collapsing it into just another instance of 
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general epistemic opacity, which it is not. This shows, that some recent attempts seeking to 
explain away clauses regarding the nature of an agent and/or the impossibilities related to it fail 
in a fundamental way to properly account for the significance of Humphreys stronger account of 
epistemic opacity. This also led to the implication that while a spectrum could be formulated in 
which both instances of opacity could be compared to one another, their differences were 
definitely not solely a matter of degree but rather a matter of kind. One kind of opacity was 
relative and tied to the agent’s epistemic status at a certain time, while the other one arose from 
an impossibility related to an agent’s essential nature. Both proved to be significantly different 
kinds of challenges. In that section of the paper I also began to introduce the notion that some 
instances of opacity may not be at all related to agential limitations. This provided a framework 
with which to group the two broad categories of epistemic opacity so far explored as being 
agent-based, which in turn evidenced their limitations as incomplete accounts of the full range of 
instances of epistemic opacity. As a preliminary step towards a conceptualization of what I call 
agent-independent instances of epistemic opacity, I also provided a formulation and an example 
of what I called agent-neutral instances of epistemic opacity. These were instances of opacity 
that while still related to features of an agent they were so related in virtue of a property such that 
made them non-responsive (not enhanced or minimized in a non-trivial manner) to agential 
resources and/or efforts.  
 
The main aim of this paper was to provide an account of what I call agent-independent instances 
of epistemic opacity and to show that conventional accounts of epistemic opacity, insofar as they 
were agent-based accounts of epistemic opacity, failed to captured them and hence were limited 
in relation to them. While the agent-neutral account of epistemic opacity, exemplified by 
challenges related to software error assessment, accounted for the way in which some instances 
of opacity were not responsive to agential modifications in terms of their epistemic resources, 
there was still work to do to show instances of opacity that did not arise in virtue of agential 
resources or lack thereof. To this aim, I provided a definition of agent-independent epistemic 
opacity which encapsulated both the unresponsiveness of agent-neutral opacity and this extra 
step of detachment signaling the origins of the opacity in something other than agential 
properties. These two elements of the definition were further exemplified by instances of 
epistemic opacity that arose in the context of mathematical error related to the rounding of 
results in computer simulations (mathematical opacity) as well as by the inaccessible processes 




As I have shown, relevant cases of error assessment in software are agent-neutral instances of 
epistemic opacity. They do not respond to changes in agential resources. Further, because of 
their fundamental aspect, they still represent a significant instance of opacity in computation that 
is not properly captured by conventional accounts such as the ones discussed above. This is 
particularly because of the unwarranted focus on agents behind conventional accounts. Agent-
based accounts of opacity in software fail to account for these cases and so fail to provide a 
complete picture of epistemic opacity. Furthermore, I have shown that there are certain instances 
of epistemic opacity, particularly related to computer simulations and machine learning methods,  
that are actually agent-independent in that the cause/origin of the opacity is non-agential. This is 
an important conceptual contribution to the understanding of epistemic opacity. As we move 
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forward with the design and development of instruments such as computer simulations and other 
computational technology, the distinctions articulated above force us to look into the artifact’s 
features and/or properties as sources and explanations of epistemic opacity. This is in sharp 
contrast to the historical and conceptual focus of conventional accounts of epistemic opacity on 
anthropocentric limitations. This is particularly important when we are in the business of creating 
instruments, such as computer simulations and other analytic tools, that have an epistemic aim 
that goes beyond simple predictions and results and towards genuine understanding of the 
phenomenon we are inquiring about (Symons and Alvarado, 2019). If we are building an 
instrument with the hopes of capturing an understanding of both the instrument and the 
phenomenon it is designed to investigate, it behooves us to distinguish between the limitations 
that are the product of our nature as epistemic agents and those that are the product of the 
artifacts themselves. This is not just for our own sake as knowers, but for science as a general 
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